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In harm’s way
Redefining professional accountability for everyday healthcare
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The tide of emotion, controversy, and judgment surrounding
paediatrician Hadiza Bawa-Garba1 has now retreated, leaving
behind deep uncertainties about the future handling of such
situations.
Avoidable harm is at its most contentious when the focus is on
accountability. Demand for accountability is fiercest when a
patient dies after care has fallen below acceptable clinical or
compassionate standards. Individual providers are often in the
frame, but these debates rarely threaten the health systems that
manufacture risk and harm as a byproduct of their work. Nor
do the public or the media seem too horrified by the lamentable
failure of the NHS to learn from the past; despite the heartfelt
wishes of grieving families, too many patients are still dying in
vain. The victims of harm can be ignored and denied access to
the truth.
Classic patient safety incidents (sometimes called “medical
errors.”) are well defined, well documented, and circumscribed
within familiar aspects of care.2 They include wrong site surgery,
medication errors, failure to recognise and act on deterioration
of an acutely ill patient, diagnostic error, misuse of machines
delivering drugs or fluids, misplacement of tubes, and loss of
test results. They happen across the world.
Root cause analyses and other forms of investigation invariably
show that these events are caused by a combination of individual
failings, systemic weaknesses, and environmental factors.3 The
thinking that led to patient safety programmes within the NHS
and in other countries at the beginning of the 21st century 4 5
emphasised the importance of a systems approach to safety.
This was reinforced by extensive research beyond healthcare
on error, causation, and the role of human factors in avoidable
incidents.6 7 Important parallels were drawn with other high risk
industries that had improved their safety record.8 As a result, a
patient safety doctrine of learning rather than judgment, thinking
systemically, and operating with no blame became policy,9
though not always practice.
Other manifestations of avoidable harm in healthcare have not
been so well thought through. This is especially true when an
individual healthcare professional contributes to patient harm
not in a single error-prone moment but through decisions made
within multiple, interlocking, dysfunctional processes of care;
in many ways this can be everyday healthcare.
The responsible components of healthcare systems and processes
are more complex and difficult to define in these circumstances.
Insiders do not always recognise systemic weaknesses for what
they are and can become habituated toclear risks to patients.
Investigations into such adverse events need a more consistent,
expert approach so that systemic problems are identified and
fixed, lessons learnt, and individual acts or omissions are
considered in the full context of the complexity and reality of
frontline care.
We cannot rely on heroism
The responsibilities of individual healthcare professionals for
patient protection are still poorly defined for those working in
services that are unsafe or within local cultures that could put
patients at risk. The inquiry into the failures of the Bristol Royal
Infirmary Children’s heart surgery service10 concluded that senior
health professionals should have broken ranks from a prevailing
“club culture” and come to the rescue of highly vulnerable young
patients. The insular and self serving environments that led to
avoidable deaths in the Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation
Trust and the Morecambe Bay Hospital maternity services were
also condemned in subsequent inquiries.11 12 Here too, the
implication was that staff working for these providers should
have drawn and held on tightly to patient safety red lines, even
when their organisations had seemingly abandoned theirs.
Statements of professional duties13 that do point clinicians to
red lines for non-collusion in poor standards of care attempt to
resolve some of these problems, and while they may work for
the kind of outlier health organisations that hit the headlines,
they have less to offer clinicians at the routine frontline of care.
Medical regulations, legal frameworks, and most statutory
inquiries have so far failed to understand the difficulties for
conscientious health professionals of keeping patients safe in a
flawed and overloaded system. The situation for junior staff is
even worse because many are enmeshed in the entrenched
hierarchies that still dominate modern healthcare. Leading
patient safety expert James Reason points to the importance in
other fields of “heroic” individuals with the exceptional personal
qualities who intervene and avert harm when a hole in the
system has blown open.14 This framework may suit exceptional
events, such as landing an ailing jumbo jet on the Hudson river
in the US,15 but exceptionalism cannot be a sound basis for
patient safety strategies in routine healthcare.
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For the sake of all patients, and the many healthcare
professionals whose daily heroism is unsung, it is time to move
towards collective accountability for patient harm and build
robust safety systems that work for everyone. Each healthcare
organisation in the country should be required to commission
an annual expert risk assessment of the safety of their clinical
services (including weekend and night time care), incorporating
patient and staff insights, and publish the results.
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